We study here the impulse control minimax problem. We allow the cost functionals and dynamics to be unbounded and hence the value functions can possibly be unbounded. We prove that the value function of the problem is continuous. Moreover, the value function is characterized as the unique viscosity solution of an Isaacs quasi-variational inequality. This problem is in relation with an application in mathematical finance.
Introduction
In this paper we study an optimal impulse control problem with finite horizon.
Optimal impulse control problems appear in many practical situations. We refer the reader to [3] (and the references cited therein) for extensive discussions. For deterministic autonomous systems with infinite horizon, optimal impulse control problems were studied in [1] , and optimal control problems with continuous, switching, and impulse controls were studied by the author [17] (see also [18] ). Differential games with switching strategies in finite and infinite duration were also studied [19, 20] . J. Yong, in [9] , also studies differential games where one person uses an impulse control and other uses continuous controls. allowing general jumps. In all these works the existence of the value functions of optimal impulse control problem and uniqueness of viscosity solution are obtained assuming that the dynamics and costs functionals are bounded and the impulse cost function should not depend on y.
Our aim in this work is to relax the boundedness assumption on cost functionals and the dynamics for impulse control problem and the impulse cost function should depend on y. Therefore the main objective of our work, and this is the novelty of the paper, is to show the existence of the value function and to characterize the value function as the only solution in viscosity sense of the associated quasivariational inequality for the finite horizon problem in suitable subclass of bounded from below continuous functions, with linear growth when the dynamics unbounded and costs functionals are bounded from below with linear growth and the impulse cost function depends on y.
This paper is organized as follows:
In Section 2, we formulate the problem and we give the related definitions. In Section 3, we give some properties of the value function, especially the dynamic programming principle. Further we provide some estimates for the optimal strategy of the optimal impulse control problem which, in combination with the dynamic programming principle, play a crucial role in the proof of the existence of the value function. Section 4 is devoted to the connection between the optimal impulse control problem and quasi-variational inequality. In Section 5, we show that the solution of QVIs is unique in the subclass of bounded from below continuous functions which satisfy a linear growth condition. 2 2 Formulation of the problem and preliminary results
Setting of the problem
Let a two-players differential game system be defined by the solution of following dynam-
where y(t) is the state of the system, with values in IR m , at time t, x is the initial state.
The time variable belongs to [t 0 , T ] where 0 ≤ t 0 < T .
The system is driven by two controls, a continuous control τ (t) ∈ K ∈ IR m , where K is compact set, and an impulsive control defined by a double sequence t 1 , ..., t k , ..., ξ 1 , ..., ξ k , ..., k ∈ IN * , where t k are the strategy, t k ≤ t k+1 and ξ k ∈ IR m the control at time t k of the jumps in y(t k ). Let (δ, ξ) := ((t k ) k≥1 , (ξ k ) k≥1 ) the set of these strategies denoted by D.
For any initial condition (t 0 , x) and controls τ () and D generating a trajectory y() of this system. The pay-off is given by the following:
The term C(t k , y(t k ), ξ k ) is called the impulse cost. It is the cost when player-ξ makes an impulse ξ k at time t k . In the game, player-ξ would like to minimize the pay-off (2.2)
by choosing suitable impulse control ξ(.), whereas player-τ wants to maximize the pay-off (2.2) by choosing a proper control
We shall sometimes write τ ∈ Ω instead of τ (.) ∈ Ω.
We now define the admissible strategies ϕ for the minimizing impulse control D, as nonanticipative strategies. We shall let D a be the set of all such non-anticipative strategies. 
Accordingly, we define the value function of the problem v :
Assumptions
Throughout this paper T (resp. m) is a fixed real (resp. integer) positive constant. Let us now consider the followings:
functions for which there exists a constant C ≥ 0 such that for any t ∈ [0, T ], τ ∈ K and
is continuous with respect to t and ξ uniformly in y with linear growth
Moreover we assume that there exists a constant α > 0 such that for any (t, x, ξ) ∈
is continuous with respect to t and τ uniformly in y with linear growth, 5) and is bounded from below.
(4)G : IR m → IR is uniformly continuous with linear growth 6) and is bounded from below.
These properties of f and g imply in particular that y(t) 0≤t≤T solution of the standard DE (2.1) exists and is unique, for any t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ IR m .
Admissible strategies
We want to investigate the problem of minimizing sup τ ∈Ω J through the impulse control. We mean to allow closed loop strategies for the minimizing control. We remark that, being only interested in the inf sup problem, and not a possible saddle point. 
Since ψ and G are linear growth, then
Now by using standard estimates from ODE, Gronwall's Lemma and the strategy where we have no impulse time, we can show that
where C is constant of T . Hence using this estimate we get
On the other hand, since the cost C(t k , y(t k ), ξ k ) are non negative functions and since ψ and G are bounded from below, then v is bounded from below.2
We are now giving some properties of the admissible strategy.
There exists a positive constant C which dose not depend on t and x such that:
P roof : Recall the characterization of (2.2) that reads as:
is the optimal strategy then we have:
Since v(t, x) ≤ C(1 + |x|) and since ψ and G are bounded from below then we have
Next we show (2.7). Taking into account that C(t, y, ξ) ≥ α > 0 for any (t, y, ξ) ∈
Finally taking into account α > 0, we obtain the desired result.2
It may be to the best advantage of the minimizer to make a jump at some time t,
immediately followed, at the same time, by another jump, and so on. As any such jump entails a cost not less than α, from Proposition 1 the number of jumps may be restricted, with no loss of generality, to be less than
(1 + |x|). To allow for the possibility of several successive but simultaneous jumps, we proceed as follows. Let
We also state the following definition:
3 The value function
Dynamic programming principle
The dynamic programming principle is a well-known property in optimal impulse control.
In our optimal control problem, it is formulated as follows: 
where
Proposition 2 The value function v(.,.) has the following property:
P roof : Assume first that for some x and t:
Then we have for t ≤ t ′ :
Among the admissible strategy ϕ ǫ 's there are those that place a jump at time t.
which implies that:
Choosing now t ′ = t, yields the relation
By sending ǫ → 0, we obtain C(t, x, ξ) < 0, which is a contradiction.2
Continuity of value function
In this section we prove the continuity of the value function. The main result of this section can be stated as follows.
We first present some preliminary results on y(.). Consider now the control D a , composed of jumps instants t 1 , t 2 , ..., t n in the interval [t, T ], with jumps ξ 1 , ξ 2 , ..., ξ n , and let y 1 (.) and y 2 (.) be the trajectories generated by D a , from y i (t) = x i , i = 1, 2.
Lemma 1 There exists a constant C such that for any s ∈ [t, T ], x 1 , x 2 ∈ IR m , and k ∈ {1, 2..., n}
P roof : By the Lipschitz continuity of f and Gronwall's Lemma, we have
Next let us show for an impulse time
Looking more carefully at the first jump and using the Lipschitz continuity of g, we have
The above assertion is obviously true for k = 1. Suppose now it holds true at step k.
Then, at step k + 1,
We are now ready to give the main Theorem of this article. P roof : Let us consider ǫ > 0 and (t ′ , x ′ ) ∈ B((t, x), ǫ) and let us consider the following set of strategies:
The strategy optimal (δ, ξ) belongs toD a from Proposition 1.
First let us show that v is upper semi-continuous. Recall the characterization of dynamical programming principle that reads as
Fix an arbitrary ǫ
Also,
Next w.l.o.g we assume that t ′ < t. Then we deduce that:
Using the uniform continuity of ψ, C in y and property (3.1), then the right-hand side of (3.4), the first and the second term converges to 0 as t ′ → t and x ′ → x. Now let us focus on the last one. Since (δ, ξ) ∈D a then
where C is a constant which comes from the linear growth of ψ and G. Taking the limit
As n and ǫ 1 are arbitrary then sending n → +∞ and ǫ 1 → 0, to obtain: lim sup
Therefore v is upper semi-continuous.
Now we show that v is lower semi-continuous.
Using the uniform continuity of ψ, C in y and property (3.1). Then the right-hand side of (3.4) the first and the second term converges to 0 as t ′ → t and x ′ → x. Now let us focus on the last one. Since ((t n ) n≥1 , (ξ n ) n≥1 ) be a admissible control then
where C is a constant which come from the linear growth of ψ and G, taking the limit
As n and ǫ 2 are arbitraries then putting n → +∞ and ǫ 2 → 0 to obtain: lim inf
Therefore v is lower semi-continuous. We then proved that v is continuous.2
Terminal value
Because of the possible jumps at the terminal time T, it is easy to see that, in general, v(t, x) does not tend to G(x) as t tends to T. Extend the set of jumps to include jumps of zero, meaning no jump. Call this extended set E 0 , extend trivially the operator N to a function independent from t, and let
We know that G and C are uniformly continuous in x then G 1 (x) is continuous. We claim
P roof : Fix (t, x) and a strategy ϕ. As in the previous proof, for each τ (), gather all jumps of ϕ(τ ) if any, in jump ξ 1 at the time T. Then we have
The right hand side above only depends on ξ 1 , not on τ (.) itself. It follows that
The result follows letting t → T.2
Viscosity characterization of the value function
In this section we prove that the value function v is a viscosity solution of the HamiltonJacobi-Isaacs quasi-variational inequality, that we replace by an equivalent QVI easier to investigate.
We now consider the following quasi-variational inequality (Isaacs equation):
with the terminal condition: v(t, x) = G 1 (x), x ∈ IR m , where G 1 is given by (3.6).
Notice that it follows from hypothesis that the term in square brackets in (4.1) above is continuous with respect to τ so that the minimum in τ over the compact K exists.
Recall the notion of viscosity solution of QVI (4.1).
Definition 3 
is a local maximum of ϕ − v, we have:
(ii) A viscosity subsolution of (4.1) if for any (t, x) ∈ [t 0 , T [×IR m and any function
is a local minimum of ϕ − v, we have: P roof : The viscosity property follows from the dynamic programming principle and is proved in [10] .2
Now we give an equivalent of quasi-variational inequality (4.1). In this section, we consider the new function Γ given by the classical change of variable Γ(t, x) = exp(t)v(t, x), for any t ∈ [t 0 , T ] and x ∈ IR m . Of course, the function Γ is bounded from below and continuous with respect to its arguments.
A second property is given by the
Proposition 3 v is a viscosity solution of (4.1) if and only if Γ is a viscosity solution to the following quasi-variational inequality in
[t 0 , T [×IR m , max min τ − ∂Γ ∂t + Γ(t, x) − ∂Γ ∂x f (t, x, τ ) − exp(t)ψ(t, x, τ ) , Γ(t, x) − M[Γ](t, x)} = 0, (4.4) where M[Γ](t, x) = inf ξ∈E [Γ(t, x + g(t, x, ξ)) + exp(t)C(t, x, ξ)]. The terminal condition for Γ is: Γ(T, x) = exp(T )G 1 (x) in IR m .2
Uniqueness of the solution of quasi-variational inequality
We are going now to address the question of uniqueness of the viscosity solution of quasivariational inequality (4.1). We have the following: Proof. We will show by contradiction that if u and w is a subsolution and a supersolution respectively for (4.4) then u ≤ w. Therefore if we have two solutions of (4.4) then they are obviously equal. Actually for some R > 0 suppose there exists (t, x) ∈ [t 0 , T ] × B R × I (B R := {x ∈ IR m ; |x| < R}) such that:
Let us take θ, λ and β ∈ (0, 1] small enough. Then, for a small ǫ > 0, let us define:
By the linear growth assumption on u and w, there exists a (t ǫ , x ǫ , y ǫ )
for R large enough, such that:
On the other hand, from 2Φ ǫ (t ǫ , x ǫ , y ǫ ) ≥ Φ ǫ (t ǫ , x ǫ , x ǫ ) + Φ ǫ (t ǫ , y ǫ , y ǫ ), we have 
it follow as λ → 0 and the continuity of u and w that, up to a subsequence, (t ǫ , x ǫ , y ǫ ) → (t, x, x). [u(t ǫ , x ǫ + g(t ǫ , x ǫ , ξ)) + exp(t ǫ )C(t ǫ , x ǫ , ξ)] ≤ 0, then there exists ξ 1 ∈ E such that:
w(t ǫ , y ǫ ) − w(t ǫ , y ǫ + g(t ǫ , y ǫ , ξ 1 )) − exp(t ǫ )C(t ǫ , y ǫ , ξ 1 ) ≥ 0, u(t ǫ , x ǫ ) − u(t ǫ , x ǫ + g(t ǫ , x ǫ , ξ 1 )) − exp(t ǫ )C(t ǫ , x ǫ , ξ 1 ) ≤ 0.
It follows that:
(1 − λ)(u(t ǫ , x ǫ ) − w(t ǫ , y ǫ ) − [(1 − λ)u(t ǫ , x ǫ + g(t ǫ , x ǫ , ξ 1 )) − w(t ǫ , y ǫ + g(t ǫ , y ǫ , ξ 1 ))] ≤ (1 − λ) exp(t ǫ )C(t ǫ , x ǫ , ξ 1 ) − exp(t ǫ )C(t ǫ , y ǫ , ξ 1 ). Now, from (2.3), we get:
Next 4θ(x ǫ − x)|x ǫ − x| 2 , f (t ǫ , x ǫ , τ ) ≤ 4Cθ|x ǫ ||x ǫ − x| 3 , and finally, 4θ(y ǫ − x)|y ǫ − x| 2 , f (t ǫ , y ǫ , τ ) ≤ 4Cθ|y ǫ ||y ǫ − x| 3 .
Taking in to account
c + d = 2β(t ǫ − t).
So that by plugging into (5.11) and note that λ > 0 we obtain:
−2β(t ǫ − t) + (1 − λ)u(t ǫ , x ǫ ) − w(t ǫ , y ǫ )
+4Cθ|x ǫ ||x ǫ − x| 3 + 4Cθ|y ǫ ||y ǫ − x| By sending ǫ → 0, λ → 0, θ → 0 and taking into account of the continuity of ψ, we obtain η ≤ 0 which is a contradiction. The proof of Theorem 5 is now complete. 2
